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Figure 2: Structure of the AA Strategy for Continuous Dou-
ble Auctions.
solution set, S, fi,j ∈ {0,1}, ∀j = {0,..,19}, of 20
packages for each client i ∈ {0,..,7}. The principal mo-
tivation for such a simpliﬁcation of the problem is that the
problem is computationally more tractable (given that the
optimiser is run several times per second). Furthermore,
the price volatility of the entertainment packages causes the
optimal plan to change too frequently (possibly every ten
seconds) which make the bidding process less reliable (as
the agent would be changing its bids as frequently to re-
ﬂect its knowledge of the optimal plan). The problem is
then to ﬁnd the number of goods to buy (and sell in the en-
tertainment auctions) for each of the 28 different auctions.
We denote these by BUY [j] where j ∈ {0,..,27} and
SELL[j] where j ∈ {0,..,27}, subject to the following
constraints:
BUY [j] ∈ {0,..,8} ∀j ∈ {0,..,7} (flight)
BUY [j] ∈ {0,..,4} ∀j ∈ {8,..,15} (hotel)
BUY [j] ∈ {0,1} ∀j ∈ {16,..27} (entertainment)
SELL[j] = 0 ∀j ∈ {0,..,15}
SELL[j] ∈ {0,1} ∀j ∈ {16,..27}
Because the demand at the current bid and the supply at
the current ask price in the entertainment auctions are un-
known (with only the quotes made public), we limit the
number of goods to buy or sell in this particular type of auc-
tion to 1. Furthermore, we avoid a plan where the agent
is required to hold an excessive number of the same hotel
room (and adopt a less risky approach by spreading more of
its bids across the different hotel auctions) by constraining
the number of the same hotel rooms in our solution. Against
this background and denoting the entertainment bonuses6 by
6The hotel bonuses are already factored in the utility for pack-
Ei,j ∈ (0,200) ∀j = {0,..,11}, owning an entertainment
ticket as ei,j ∈ {0,1}, ∀j = {0,..,11} for each client
i ∈ {0,..,7} and the utility of each package fi,j as ui,j,
we maximise the following objective function (which is the
proﬁt):
max
7 X
i=0
19 X
j=0
(fi,j × ui,j) +
7 X
i=0
19 X
j=0
(ei,j × Ei,j)
−
27 X
j=0
(BUY [j] × price[j]) +
27 X
j=16
(SELL[j] × price[j]) (1)
To meet the requirements of a feasible package for the
TAC game, we impose a set of constraints (similar to those
in the optimisation problem modelled by (He & Jennings
2004)) on our optimisation problem. While the exact for-
mulation is given by He & Jennings, we summarise the con-
straints as follows:
(i) The number of hotel rooms required must be less or
equal to the number of room the agent owns or intends
to acquire.
(ii) The entertainment tickets must be used within the time
of the client’s stay.
(iii) Each client, i, has only one valid package, P19
j=0 fi,j ≤ 1.
(iv) The number of entertainment tickets used must be
less or equal to the number of tickets the agent owns
and intends to acquire less the number it intends to
sell,
P7
i=0 ei,j ≤ OWN[j + 16] + BUY [j + 16] −
SELL[j+16]forentertainmentauctionj ∈ {0,..,11}
where OWN[j] is the number of goods the agent
owns. This differs from He & Jennings’s model as
we consider buying and selling entertainment tickets
in our model.
(v) The number of ﬂight tickets required must be less or
equal to the tickets the agent owns or intends to ac-
quire.
(vi) For each client, each type of entertainment ticket can
be used only once.
The solution to our optimisation problem is then the opti-
mal plan deﬁning the different optimal packages, fi,j and
the different number of goods to buy (BUY [j]) or sell
(SELL[j]) in each auction. Given how we model our opti-
misation problem, the next issue is the pricing of the goods.
A myopic approach would be to consider the current prices,
but this would ignore the fact that prices changes, and an
agent can gain by knowing whether prices will rise or fall,
whether to buy immediately or wait for better opportunities.
Indeed, our strategy considers predicted prices at when it in-
tends to buy the goods given its behaviour (see Subsection
above on the behavioural layer). We next describe the ap-
proach we take to predict these prices.
ages within set S where we consider the two types of hotels.